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ABSTRACT
Employment tests predict job performance because they measure or are correlated
with a large set of malleable developed abilities which are causally related
to productivity. Our economy currently under-rewards the achievements that
are measured by these tests. Consequently, economic incentives to study hard
in high school are minimal and this absence of incentives has contributed
to the low levels of achievement in math and science. The paper concludes
with a discussion of ways in which employment tests can strengthen incentives
to learn.
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. EMPLOYMENT TESTING AND INCENTIVES TO LEARN
Emplo}lment testing appears to be destined to have a growing role in the
allocation of workers to jobs. The legal impediments to the use of aptitude
tests appear to be diminishing (Sharf 1988). Even if the trend of court
decisions accepting the claims of validity generalization were to be reversed,'
employers and society can gain most of the benefits of improved selection
by top down hiring from a ranking generated by race normed test scores (Schmidt
1988; Wigdor and Hartigan 1988). As a result, there is no necessary conflict
between minority interests and greater use of tests in employment selection.
As a result, test use appears to be growing. A 1985 American Society. for
Personnel Administration survey found that 24 percent of the firms responding
had increased testing in the past year and another 44 percent were considering
an increase in the amount of testing they do.
Greater use of employment tests will have major effects on the economy.
The most obvious effect of testing is the impact on the sorting of workers
across jobs and occupations. The literature reviewed in Hunter (1986) and
Schmidt (1988) indicates that employment tests yield information on the
probable job performance of job applicants that is not available from other
sources. If a trait measured by a test has a larger effect on dollars of
output in occupation A than in occupation B, recruiting people who do well
on the test into occupation A will increase national output. Hunter and
Schmidt (1982) present a simple method for calculating this effect. They
calculate that if all workers were distributed across four major occupational
cntegories on the basis of a single test score, national income would be 4
percent higher than it would be under random assignment of workers to major
occupational category. However, since people are already recruited into high
~status jobs on the basis of years of schooling, SAT scores, college major,
grades and performance in past jobs (which as a group can explain much of
the variance of test scores), greater use of tests by employers would probably
have much smaller effects on national output than those calculated by Hunter
and Schmidt. In other respects, however, their calculation of sorting effects
may understate the effects of greater test use on national productivity, so
it is not clear what would emerge from a calculation based on a more
complicated and realistic model.
The second way in which employment testing affects national output is
its impact on incentives to develop the skills and competencies .measured by
the test. In my view, employment tests measuring verbal and mathematical
ability predict job performance because they measure or are correlated with
a large set of malleable developed abilities which are causally related to
productivity and the ability to learn new job specific skills. Adoption
studies have found that children adopted by upper middle class parents have
significantly higher IQ and academic achievement than the siblings who remain
with their lower class parents (Schiff et al 1978, 1982, Dumaret 1985, Duyme
1985). other studies have shown that school attendance raises scores on these
aptitude tests (Lorge 1945; Husen 1951; Department of Labor 1970) and that
taking a rigorous college prep curriculum increases the gains on these tests
between sophomore and senior years of high school (Bishop 1985; Hotchkiss
1985). In recognition of the fact that aptitude test scores are significantly
influenced by educational background, the College Board describes the SAT
as a measure of "developed verbal and mathematical reasoning abilities (1987,
p. 3)"
JThis short note is not the place for a thorough review of the evidence
'egarding just how malleable these developed abilities are. Since, however,
it relates directly to Gottfredson's paper in this volume, I will discuss
the malleability of racial differences in academic achievement and IQ.
Gottfredson (1988) argues that racial differentials in IQ are very stubborn
and that, consequently, coLor blind use of employment tests will probably
have an adverse impact on blacks for generations. Citing Gordon (in press),
she reports' that the IQ gap between whites and blacks has been relatively
stable ever since 1918. Since mean IQ levels of the entire population rose
more than 15 points between 1918 and 1968 (Tuddenham 1948, Flynn 1984), this
implies that the mean IQ of blacks rose as well. The failure of the gap to
close during the first 50 years of IQ testing takes on much less significance
when one realizes that both groups were rapidly improving.
In more recent data, however, the gap is closing. Blacks born after
the civil rights revolution are doing much better in school than those born
prior to 1960. The evidence is presented in Table 1. In the first National
Assessment of Educational Progress black high school seniors born around 1954
were 5.3 grade level equivalents behind their white counterparts in reading
proficiency. In the first assessment of math skills, black high school seniors
born around 1957 were 4 grade level equivalents behind in mathematics. The'
most recent National Assessment data for 1986 reveals that the gap in math
proficiency has been cut to 2.9 grade level e~livalents in just 12 years and
that the reading gap has been cut to 2.6 years in just 15 years. Koretz's
(1986 Appendix E) analysis of data from state testing programs supports the
NAEP findings. Gains of this magnitude contradict Gottfredson's pessimistic
assessment and suggest that Head Start, Title I and other compensatory
Test Date
1971 1973 1975 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986
Reading
At Age 17 5.3 5.0 4.8 3.3 2.6
At Age 13 4.2 3.9 3.3 2.8 2.3
Math
At Age 17 4.0 3.8 3.:2 2.9
At Age 13 4.6 4.2 3.4 2.4
Table 1
Racial Gap in Reading and Math Proficiency
[In Grade Equivalent Units]
Source: National Assessment of EGucational,Progress, 'rhe Reading Report Card.
1985; Data Appendix and Who Reads Best?, February 1988, Table 1.1. The
difference between the scores of 17 year aids and 9 year aids was 75 points
on the NAEP scale used in the report covering 1971 through 1984 and 18 on
the scale used in the report on the 1986 assessment. Consequently, a grade
equivalent unit was defined as 9.375 points on the NAEP scale used in the
1971-84 report and 2.25 points on the scale used in the report on the 1986
assessment. The Mathematics Report Card. June 1988, Figure 1.2. The
difference between the scores of 17 year aids and 9 year aids was 80.3 points
on the NAEP scale. Consequently, a grade equivalent unit was defined as 10
points on the NAEP scale.
4interventions are having an impact. The schools attended by most black
students are still clearly inferior to those attended by white students so
further reductions in the school quality differentia13 will probably produce
further reductions in academic achievement differentials. Consequently, it
is my view that there is reason to expect that further expansions and
improvements of Head start and compensatory education can just about eliminate
the racial gap in academic achievement for youngsters from similar socio-
economic backgrounds.
Greater use by employers of tests measuring competence in reading,
writing, mathematics and problem solving will inevitably increase the economic
rewards for having these abilities. If as argued above the developed abilities
measured by these tests are trainable, their supply will increase as young
people respond to the improved incentives and devote more time and energy
to learning. In my judgement, the effects of testing on the aggregate supply
of skilled workers may be considerably more important than its sorting effects.
This judgement follows from three propositions which will be defended below:
1. The labor market under-rewards the developed abilities measured by
these tests.
2. Young people would devote more time and energy to developing these
abilities if the rewards were greater.
3. Greater use of employment tests measuring a broad range of cognitive
achievements such as the ASVAB would both increase validity of
employment selection and improve the economic rewards for learning.
The first of these propositions is defended in the section 1. The minimal
use of tests of academic achievement or credentials based on them as devices
.for selecting employees is in large part responsible for the failure of the
,
,
labor market to appropriately reward effort and achievement in high school.
The second section of the paper presents evidence for proposition # 2. It
examines incentives to study hard in high school, and presents evidence that
more powerful labor market rewards for learning are needed to strengthen these
incentives. The final section of the paper defends proposition # 3. It
presents evidence that employment tests that measure verbal and mathematical
ability only such as the G aptitude of the GATB are less valid than broad
spectrum achievement tests like the ASVAB which measure scientific, technical
and mechanical achievements as well. It concludes with recommendations for
how employment tests can contribute to strengthening incentives to learn.
I. The Absence of Major Economic Rewards for Effort in High School
The decline in test scores and the poor performance of American students
on international mathematics and science tests has stimulated a great deal
of concern about the quality of education. An educational reform moyement
has developed that is attempting to add rigor to the curriculum and improve
teaching. These are impurtant objectives, and some progress has been made.
If, however, students are not motivated to study harder, the reform initiatives
will fail. Too little attention has been given to student motivation. In
the area of student motivation, employment testing potentially has an important
role to play.
studies of time use and time on task in high school show that students
actively engage in a learning activity for only about half the time they are
scheduled to be in school. In 1980, high school students spent an average
of 3.5 hours per week on homework. When homework is added to engaged time
at school, the total time devoted to study, instruction, and practice is only
20 hours per week. By comparison, the typical senior spent 10 hours per
,
~.j
I('~}k in a part-time job and nearly 7.5 hours watching television. Thus, TV
occupies more of an adolescents time than learning.
Even more important is the intensity of the student's involvement in'
the process. Theodore Sizer described American high school students as
"docile, compliant, and without initiative" (Sizer 1984). Coming to the same
conclusion, John Goodlad observed, "the extraordinary degree of student
passivity stands out" (Goodlad 1984). When teachers are asked what they feel
are the most important problems in education, more than 40% respond, "lack
of interest by students". This lack of interest makes it very difficult for
teachers to be demanding.
Some teachers are able to overcome the obstacles and induce their students
to undertake hard learning tasks. But for most mortals the lassitude of the
students is too demoralizing. In too many classrooms an implicit agreement
prevails in which the students trade civility for lowered academic demands
(Sizer 1984). We assign teachers the responsibility for setting high
standards, but we do not give them any effective means except the force of
their own personality for inducing student acceptance of the 3.cademic goals
of the classroom. Most students view the costs of studying hard as much
greater than the benefits, so the peer group pressures the teacher to go easy.
All too often teachers are forced to compromise their academic demands. In
the current institutional environment, one cannot realistically exPect to
identify and attract enough gifted teachers to solve the motivation problem.
But students are not the only group that is apathetic. Stevenson, Lee
and Stigler's (1986) study of education in Taiwan, Japan and the U.S. found
that even though American children were learning the least in school, American
parents were the most satisfied with the performance of their local schools.
'I
Villydo Japanese and Taiwanese parents hold their children and their schools
':o.a highpr standard thanl\merican parents?
The fundamental cause of the apathy and mot i vati,:)n problem is the way
VJe recogrllze and reinforce student effort and achievement. The educa ti onal
decisions of students and their parents are significa~tly influenced by the
costs (in money, time and psychological effort) and benefits (praise, prestige,
employment, wage rates, and job satisfaction) that result. The problem is
that while there are benefits to staying in high school, most students do
not benefit very much from working hard while in high school. This is in
large measure a consequence of the failure of the labor market to reward effort
and achievement in high sc:hool.
students who plan to Look for a job immediately after high school
generally see very little connection between their academic studies and their
future' success in the labor market. statistical studies of the youth labor
market confirm their skepticism about the economic benefits of studying hard:
For high school students, high school grades and performance on
academic achievement/aptitude tests have essentially no impact on
labor market success. 'l'hey have -
--no effect on the chances of finding work when one is seeking
it during high school, and
--no effect on the wage rate of the jobs obtained while in high
school. (Hotchkiss, Bishop and Gardner 1982)
As one can see in table 2, for those who do not go to college fu11-
time, high school grades and test scores had -
--no effect on the wage rate of the jobs obtained immediately after
Datp Percent Change
of Achievement 1n Wage Rate
study and Data Set Graduation Age Measures Male Female
Wage Rates
Kang & B i SIlOp (1985) 1980 19 Test-Math,Voc,Read .1.9 -..5
High School & Beyond GPA in Grade 12 .0 :2.:J
Gardner (1983) 1976-1982 19-24 AFQT 4.u '}.n
NLS Youth
Dayrnont & P.umberger 1976-1979 19-21 GPA 1n Grade 9 .3 2.7
NLS Youth (1982)
Meyer (1982) 1'372 19 Class Rank Grade 12 0.0 2.5
(Weekly earnings) Test Composite 1.2 2.2
Class of 1972
Earnings
Hause (1975) 1'361 19 IQ,Test-Math -3.7
Project Talent (white) 23 IQ,Test-!1ath 6.1
Table 2.
Effect of Academic Achievemenc
0n the Wage Rates of High School Graduates
The table reports the percentage response of the wage rate or earnings to done
standard de'Jiat.lonimprovemfmt in a measure of academic dchievement. For high
school seniors a one standard deviation differential on an achievement test is
about equal to 3.5 grade level equivalents or 110 points on the Verbal SAT. For
GPA, one standard deviation is about .7 when C's = 2.0, B's = 3.0 and A's = 4.0.
0,
high school in Kang and Bishop's (1985) analysis of High School
Clnd Beyond seniors and only a 1 to 4.7 percent increase in wages
per standard deviation (SD) improvemeflt i.n test scores and grade
point average .in Meyer's (1982) analysis of Class of 1972 data.
--a moderate effect on wage rates and earnings after 4 or 5 years
{Gardner (1982) found an effect of 4.8 percent per SD of achievement
and Meyer (1983) found an effect of 4.3 to 6.0 percent per SD of
achievement),
--a small effect on employment and earnings immediately after high
school.
In almost all entry-level jobs, wage rates reflect the level of the
job not the worker's productivity. Thus, the employer, not the worker,
benefits from a worker's greater productivity. Cognitive abilities
and productivity make promotion more likely, but it takes time for
the imperfect sorting process to assign a particularly able worker
a job that fully uses that greater ab_ility -- and pays accordingly.
fhe long delay before labor market rewards are received is important because
most teenagers are "now" oriented, so benefits promised for 10 years in t'ne
future may have little influence on their decisions.
Although the economic benefits of higher achievement are quite modest
for young workers and do not become really substantial until long after
graduation, the benefits to the employer (and therefore, to national
production) are immediately apparent in higher productivity. This is the
implication of the finding that tests of reading, mathemati9s, problem solving
ability and familiarity with scientific and technical matters are valid
pred.ictors of job p~rformance in most jobs.
'I
Studies that measure output for different workers in the same job at
the Sdme finn, using physical output as a criterion, have found that the
standard ceviation of output varies '.vithjob complexity and averages about
.164 in routine clerical jubs and .278 in clerical jobs with decision making
. responsibilities (Hunter, ::;chmidt and Judiesch 1988). Since there are fixed
costs to employing an individual (facilities, equipment, light, heat and
overhead functions such as hiring and payrolling), thE~ coefficlent of variation
of marginal products of individuals will be considerably greater (Klein, Spady,
and Weiss 1983). On the assumption that the coeff iciE~nt of 'lariat ion' of
marginal productivity for clerical jobs is 30 percent
[1.5*( .33*.278+.67*.164»), a .5 validity for general mental ability implies
that an academic achievement differential between two individuals of one
standard ~eviation (in a distribution of high school graduates) is associated
with a productivity differential in the job of about 11 percent (.5*.74*30%
where.74 is the ratio of i~he high school graduate te:;t score standard
deviation to the population standard deviation.
Figure 1 compares the percentage effect of mathematical and verbal
achievement (specifically d one standard deviation difference in CPA and/or
test scores) on the productivity of a clerical worker, on wages of male
clerical workers (from Taubman and Wales 1975), and on the wages of young
women who have not gone to college (from Kang and Bishop 1985 and Meyer 1982).
Productivity clearly increases much more than wage rates. Apparently it is
a youth's employer, not the youth, who benefits the most when a non-college-
l)()l.md student works hard in school and improves his or her academic
achievements. The youth is more likely to find a job, but not one with an
}
';°6
10"0
IMPACT OF ~CADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT
11%
~)?o
0
Job
Performance
Clerical
Job
]
. f)'~
Wage
Rate
in Clerical
Occupation
lO-45 'II'.old
F'igure 1
1.796
Wage
Rate
19 yr. old
Female
HSG
(,.0%
\'lage
Rate
22--23 yr. old
Female
HSG
1r
appreciably higher wage. The next sub-section examines reasons for the
,'I°lscrepancy .
R~asons [(IC the Discrepancy between Wage Rates and Productivity on the Job
Employers are presumably competing for better workers. Why doesn't
competition result in much higher wages for those who achieve in high school
and have strong basic skills? The cause appears to be the lack of objective
information available to employers on applicant accomplishments, skills, and
productivity.
A 1987 survey of a stratified random sample of small and medium sized
eIT~loyers who were members of the National Federation of Independent Business
(NFIB) found that aptitude test scores had been obtained in only 3.15 percent
of the hiring decisions studied (Bishop and Griffin 1988). Top down hiring
on the basis test scores is even more unusual. Prior to 1971, the use of
aptitude tests was much more extensive. The cause of this change was the
fear of costly litigation over the business necessity and validity of aptitude
tests. The EEOC's codification of the APA's professional testing standards
and its theory of situational and subgroup differences in validity into federal
law made the required validation studies so costly it discouraged almost all
employers from undertaking the effort.
other potential sources of infOrmation on effort and achievement in high
school are transcripts and referrals from teachers who know the applicant.
Both these means are under used. In the NFIB survey, transcripts had been
obtained prior to the selection decision for only 13.7 percent of the hiring
events in which someone with 12 or fewer years of schooling was hired. If
a student or graduate has given written permission for a transcript to be
sent to an employer, the Buckley amendment obligates the school to respond.
l1
Many high schools are not, however, responding to such requests. The
experience of Nationwide Insurance, one of Columbus, Ohio's most respected
employers, is probably representative of what happens in most communities.
The company obtains permission to get high school records from all young people
who interview fora job. [t sent over 1,200 such signed requests to high
schools in 1982 and received only 93 responses. Employers reported that
colleges were much more responsive to transcript reqw=sts than high schools.
High schools have apparently designed their systems for responding to requests
for transcripts- around the needs of college bound students not around the
needs of the students who seek a job immediately aftec graduating.
There is an additional barrier to the use of high school transcripts
in selecting new employees--when high schools do respond, it takes a great
deal of time. For Nationwide Insurance the response almost invariably took
more than 2 weeks. Given this time lag, if employers required transcripts
prior to making hiring selections, a job offer could not be made until a month
or so after an application had been received. Most jobs are filled much more
rapidly than that. A survey of 3500 employers in 1982 conducted by the
National Center for Research in Vocational Education found that 83.5 percent
of all jobs were filled in less than a month, and 65 percent were filled in
less than 2 weeks.
The only information about school experiences requested by most employers
is years of schooling, diplomas and certificates obtained, and area of
specialization. Probably because of unreliable reporting and the threat of
EEOC litigation, only 16 percent of the NFIB employers asked the applicants
with 12 or fewer years of schooling to report their grade point average.
Hiring on the basis of recommendations by high school teachers is also
1".,.L
unconunon. In the NFIB survey, when someone with 12 or fewer years of schooling
was hired, the new hire had been referred or reconunended by vocational teachers
only 5.5 percent of the time and referred by someone else in the high school
only 3.1 percent of the time.
Consequently, hiring selections and starting wage rates often do not
reflect the competencies and abilities students have developed in school.
Instead, hiring decisions are based on observable characteristics (such as
years of schooling and field of study) that serve as signals for the
competencies the employer cannot observe directly. As a result, the worker's
wage reflects the average productivity of all workers with the same set of
educational credentials rather than that individual's productivity or academic
achievement.
This evidence implies that the social benefits of developing one's verbal,
mathematical and scientific capabilities are considerably greater than the
private rewards. Despite their higher productivity, young workers who have
achieved in high school and who have done well on academic achievement tests
do not receive higher wage rates inunediately after high school. The student
who works hard must wait many years to start really benefiting and even then
the magnitude of the wage dnd earnings effect--a 1 to 2 percent increase'in
earnings per grade level e<ruivalent on achievement tests--is considerably
smaller than the actual change in productivity that results.
II. Will Larger Economic Rewards for Learning
Induce Students to Study Harder?
Learning that is certified by a credential is rewarded handsomely. The
magnitude of the earnings payoff to a credential has been shown to have
significant effects on the numbers of students entering college and choosing
13
sp~cific majors (Freeman 1971, 1976). Learning not certified by a credential
is either not rewarded or only modestly rewarded. Consequently, there are
strong incentives to stay in school; but much weaker incentives to study hard
while in school. If students are to be motivated to devote more time and
energy to learning, they must believe their effort will be rewarded. If
parents are to be induced to demand better schools and to spend the time
supervising homework, they too must believe that better teaching, a more
rigorous curriculum and hard study produces learning which will be rewarded
in the labor market. When, however, the only signals of learning
accomplishment that are available--eg. GPA and rank in class--describe one's
performance relative to close friends, the motivation to study and to demand
better schools is undermined.
The Zero-Sum Nature of Academic Competition in High School
The secpnd root cause of the lack of real motivation to learn is peer
pressure against studying hard. Students report that "in most of the regular
classes... If you raise your hand more than twice in a class, you are called
a 'teachers pet.'" Its OK to be smart, you cannot help that. It is definitely
not OK to study hard to get a good grade. An imPortant reason for this peer
pressure is that the academic side of school forces adolescents to compete
against close friends. Their achievement is not being measured against an
absolute or an external standard. In contrast to scout merit badges where
recognition is given for achieving a fixed standard of competence, the only
measures of achievement that receive attention in American schools are measures
of one's performance relative to one's close friends such as grades and rank
in class. When students try hard and excel in school, they are making things
worse for friends. When we set up a zero sum competition among close friends,
-
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we should not be surprised when they decide not to compete. All work groups
have ways of sanctioning "rate busters." High school students call them "brain
geeks","grade grubbers" and "brown nosers".
Adolescents are not lazy. In their jobs after school and at football
practice they work very hard. In these environments they are not competing
against each other. They are working together as part of a team. Their
individual efforts are visible to their peers and appreciated by them. On
the sports field, there is no greater sin than giving up, even when the score
is hopelessly one sided. In too many high schools, when it comes to academics,
there is no greater sin than trying hard.
Another reason for peer norms against studying is that most students
perceive the chance of receiving recognition for an academic achievement to
be so slim they have given up trying. At most high school awards ceremonies
the recognition and awards go to only a few--those at the very top of the
class. By 9th grade most students are already so far behind the leaders,
that they know they have no realistic chance of being perceived as academically
successful. Their reaction is often to denigrate the students who take
learning seriously and to honor other forms of achievement--athletics, dating,
holding your liquor and being "cool"--which offer them better chances of
success.
The lack of standards for judging academic achievement that do not
involve comparisons with one's close friends and the resulting zero sum nature
of academic competition also influences the school board and the political
system. Parents can see that setting higher academic standards or hiring
better teachers will not improve their child's grade pOint average o~ rank
'-
in class. Since the Scholastic Aptitude Test is intended to be curriculum
15
free, adding rigorous science, history and calculus courses to the curriculum
is unlikely to change SAT scores. In any case, doing well on the SAT matters
only for those who aspire to attend a small number of highly selective
colleges. The parents of children not planning to go to college have an even
weaker incentive to demand high standards. They believe that what counts
in the labor market is getting the diploma not learning algebra (and they
happen to be right). Higher standards might put at risk what is really
important--the diploma.
The real costs of mediocre schools become apparent only to employers and
to officials at higher levels of government. The whole community loses because
the work force is less efficient and it becomes difficult to attract new
industry. This is precisely the reason why employers, governors and state
legislatures have been the energizing force of school reform. State
governments, however,' are far removed from the classroom and the instruments
available to them for imPosing reform are limited. If students, parents and
school board officials perceive the rewards for learning to be minimal, state
efforts to improve the quality of education will not succeed.
Evidence of a Learnin~ Response to Economic Incentives
The tendency to under-reward effort and learning in school appears to
be a peculiarly American phenomenon. Grades in school are a crucial
determinant of which employer a German youth apprentices with. Top companies
in Japan and Europe often hire lifetime employees directly out of secondary
school. Teacher recommendations, grades in school, and scores on national
and provincial exams have a significant impact on who gets to work at the
more prestigious firms (Leestma, et. al., 1987). .Japanese parents know that
their son or daughter's future economic and social rank in society critically
16
depends on how much he or she leprns in secondary school. Furthermore,
learning achievement tends to be defined and measured relative to ~veryone
else in the state or nation and not just relative to one's classmates in the
school. Entry into ,the better high schools depends primarily on the child's
performance in junior high school, not on where the parents can afford to
live as occurs in the us. These are the reasons why Japanese parents demand
so much of their children and of their schools. This is why Japanese 5th
graders spend 32.6 hours a week involved in academic activities while American
youngsters devote only 19.6 hours to their studies (stevenson, Lee and Stigler
1986).
Japanese adolescents work extremely hard in high school, but once they
have entered college, they stop working. For most students a country club
atmosphere prevails. The reason for the change in behavior is that employers
apparently care only about which university the youth attends, not about the
individual's academic achievement at the university. Working hard is not
a national character trait, it is a response to the way Japanese society
rewards academic achievement.
American students, in contrast, take it easy in high school but generally
work quite hard in college. This change is due, in part, to the fact that
academic achievement in college has important effects on labor market success.
When higher level jobs requiring a bachelors or associates degree are being
filled, employers pay much more attention to grades and teacher recommendations
than when they hire high school graduates. The NFIB survey found that when
someone with 16 or more years of schooling was hired, 26 percent of the
employers had reviewed the college transcript before making the selection,
7.8 percent had obtained a recommendation from a major professor and 6.3
17
percent had 'obtained a recommendation from a professor outside of the graduates
major or from the colleges's placement office.
III. Structuring Signals of Academic Achievement
to Maximize Incentive Effects
The foregoing analysis implies that student incentives to learn and
parental incentives to demand a quality education are maximized when the
following is true: (1) significant economic rewards depend directly and visibly
on academic accomplishments, (2) the accomplishment is defined relative to
an externally imposed standard of achievement and not relative to one's
classmates, (3) the reward is received immediately, (4) everyone, including
those who begin high school with serious academic deficiencies, has an
achievable goal which will generate a significant reward and {5} progress
toward the goal can be monitored by the student, parents and teacher. It
is not easy to design a system of signaling and certifying academic achievement
which satisfies all of these requirements. Consequently, it will generally
be desireable to simultaneously use more than one signal of academic
achievement. Let us examine the alternatives.
Diplomas:
The standard high school diploma satisfies requirement 2, 3, 4 and 5
but it fails to satisfy requirement # 1, the most critical requirement of
all. Minimum competency tests for receiving a high school diploma are an
improvement, for they are an example of an externally imposed standard of
achievement. They are a step in the right direction, especially when they
are taken early in high school, and remedial classes are offered after school
and during the summer for those who fail on the first try. However, some
students arrive in high school so.far behind that setting a high minimum would
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cause many to give up trying. Cpnsequently, the minimum standard is not set
very high and fails to challenge most students.
Competency Profiles:
Competency profiles are check lists of competencies that a student has
developed through study and practice. The ratings of competence that appear
on a competency profile are relative to an absolute standard, not relative
to other students in the class. By evaluating students against an absolute
standard, the competency profile prevents one student's effort from negatively
affecting the grades received by other students. It encourages students to
share their knowledge and teach each other.
A second advantage of the competency profile approach to evaluation is
that students can see their progress as new skills are learned and checked
off. The skills not yet checked off are the learning goals for the future.
Seeing such a check list getting filled up is inherently reinforcing.
with a competency profile system, goals can be tailored to the student's
interests and capabilitie~, and progress toward these goals can be monitored
and rewarded. Students who have difficulty in their required academic subjects
can, nevertheless, take pride in the occupational competencies that they are
developing and which are now recognized just as prominently as course grades
in academic subjects. Upon graduation, the competency profile would be encased
in plastic and serve as a credential certifying occupational competencies.
If the ratings by teachers (and the sponsoring employers of cooperative
education students) are reliable indicators of competence, employers wili
find this information very valuable, and the students who build a good record
.will be handsomely rewarded.
..
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Hiring Based on Grades in High School:
Using grades to select new hires results in a very visible dependence
of labor market outcomes on an indicator of academic accomplishment. There
are, however, two disadvantages. It results in zero-sum competition between
classmates and consequently contributes to peer pressure against studying
and parental apathy about the quality of teaching and the rigor of the
curriculum. The second problem is that it induces students to select easy
courses and teachers to go easy in their grading~ These problems can be
mitigated somewhat if employers take the rigor of courses into account when
evaluating grades, give preference to schools with tough grading standards,
and vary the number hired from particular schools in response to the actual
job performance of past hires from that school. From the employer's point
of view, the disadvantage of high school GPA is that it is difficult to adjust
these grades for the grading standards of the school and without such
adjustment grades have rather low validity.
Job Tryout and Promotions Based on Performance:
From the point of view of motivating students to study, the problem with
job tryout and performance reward systems is that the dependence of labor
market outcomes on academic achievements is both invisible and considerably
delayed. From the employer's point of view, the disadvantages of job tryout
are the costs of training workers who end up being fired, its unpopularity
with workers who will spend months unemployed if they are fired, and its
potential for generating grievances. Performance evaluations are known to
be unreliable, and this makes workers reluctant to take jobs in which next
year's pay is highly contingent on one supervisor's opinion. Pay that is
highly contingent on performance can also weaken cooperation and generate
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incentives to sabotage others. The benefits of performance reward systems
are that they motivate better performance, they tend to attract high performers
to the firm, and they tend to induce the high performers to stay at the firm.
When these factors are balanced, it appears that most workers and employers
choose compensation schemes in which differentials in relative productivity
result in relatively small wage differentials (Bishop 1987).
Job Knowledge Tests:
From the point of view of learning incentives, the disadvantage of job
knowledge tests is that they do not generate incentives to study math, science,
history and literature and may induce students to over-specialize in school.
They are left high and dry if they can not obtain a job in the field for which
they prepared. From the employer's point of view, job knowledge tests are
appropriate if there is a pool of already trained workers available and there
is no intention of event~ally promoting the people selected into jobs requiring
a different set of skills. Job knowledge tests are less useful if the pool
of job applicants has no experience in the field. The possibility of court
challenges complicates matters here for validity generalization may not apply,
and each job knowledge test may have to stand on its own merits. Development
costs are high, so smqll occupations may never have job knowledge tests
developed for them.
IQ Tests:
students, parents and teachers view IQ tests as measuring something that
schools do not teach. Even though this public perception is not really
correct, the perception is not likely ~o change in the near future, so hiring
on the basis of IQ tests fails requirement # 1. As Jencks and Crouse (1982)
have already pointed out with respect to SAT tests, students will not see
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the connection between how hard they study and higher IQ scores. From the
employer's point of view, the problems with using IQ tests to select workers
are (1) that individually administered IQ tests are too expensive and cannot
be made secure, (2) paper and pencil IQ tests like GATB's G aptitude contain
spatial relations subtests which contribute little to validity and have adverse
impact on women and (3) IQ tests are less valid than broad spectrum achievement
tests such as the ASVAB which emphasize fields of knowledge that are useful
in the job.
Broad Spectrum Achievement Tests:
From the point of view of incentives to study a broad range of academic
subjects, broad spectrum achievement tests such as the ASVAB are the best
of all the alternatives reviewed. If some of the subtests in the battery
include material covered in the standard college prep high school curriculum
such as algebra, statistics, chemistry, physics and computers, the use of
such tests for selection would generate parental pressure for an upgraded
curriculum and encourage high school students to take more rigorous courses.
When employers offering the better jobs use achievement tests to select new
employees, everyone who wants a good job faces a strong incentive to study,
and those not planning to go to college will find the incentive especially
strong. The best paying firms will find they can set higher test score cutoffs
than low paying firms, so the reward for learning will become continuous.
Whether one begins 9th grade way behind or way ahead, there will be a benefit
on the margin to studying hard for it will improve one's job prospects.
Broad spectrum achievement tests covering science, computers, mechanical
principles, and technology as well as mathematics, reading and vocabulary
are the preferred method of assessing general cognitive skills from the'
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employer's point of view as well. Test batteries which cover the full spectrum
of knowledge and skills taught in high school are more valid predictors of
job performance than tests which assess math and verbal skills only. Evidence
for this statement comes from examining the relative contributions .of various
subtests to the total validity of the ASVAB battery. Sims and Hiatt's (1981)
analysis of the job performance of 23,061 Marine recruits found, for example,
that validity (corrected for restriction of range) was .38 for auto shop
information, .43 for mechanical comprehension, .42 for electronics information,
.46 for general science, .42 for word knowledge, .50 for rnathematics knowledge,
and .48 for arithmetic reasoning. Tests measuring electronics, mechanical,
automotive and shop knowledge--material that is generally studied only in
vocational courses--have high validity. Analyzing this and other military .
data sets, Hunter, Crosson and Friedman (1985) concluded that the "general
cognitive ability" construct that best predicted performance in all military
jobs included subtests in general science, electronics information, mechanical
comprehension and mathematics knowledge as well as conventional word knowledge,
paragraph comprehension and arithmetic reasoning subtests. The addition of
these four subtests to the construct increased validity by 9 percent and the
proportion of true job performance variance explained from .306 to .364.
They also found that auto and shop information significantly improved the
prediction of performance in jobs in the mechanical job family. I suspect
that tests measuring understanding of statistics, business, economics,
marketing and psychology would similarly improve the validity of batteries
used to select workers for most white collar jobs in the private sector.
Will the courts allow firms to use broad spectrum achievement tests
covering subjects not offered until the final years of high school? My fear
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is that, since the research on test validity in the civilian sector has used
the GATB almost exclusively, employers may be forced to use reading,
vocabulary, and arithmetic reasoning tests that are demonstrably similar to
their GATB counterpart~. If the studies of the ASVAB's validity in predicting
performance in military jobs are not accepted as evidence for similar jobs
i.n the civilian sector, it might be a decade before tests measuring general
science and electronics knowledge could be used as a general selection device
for blue collar jobs. Courts might require that employers demonstrate that
each item on a science test have a specific application in each job for which
it is a proposed selection device. To avoid having to redesign the test for'
each job, test developers would dumb the test down and include only simple
questions covering scientific principles that are learned in elementary school.
Costly validity studies covering tens of thousands of workers might be
necessary before broad spectrum achievement tests covering the material
included in rigorous high school courses have their validity generalized and
become available as selection tools.
In Japan and many European countries, the educational system administers
achievement test batteries (eg. the '0' Levels in the UK, the Baccalaureate
in France) which are closely tied to the curriculum. Because they generate
credentials which signal academic achievement to all employers and not just
the employers who choose to use employment tests, these school sponsored
achievement tests have much stronger incentive effects than greater employer
use of achievement tests wil~ have in the US. Employer administered
achievement tests have weaker" incentive effects than school sponsored exams
but they are nevertheless desireable if the credentials awarded by schools
do not signal a student's true academic achievements.
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To maximize the incentive effects, it is essential that students, parents
and teachers be aware that local employers are using tests for selection and
what kind of material is included on these tests. Employers should seek out
ways of publicizing their use of broad spectrum achievement tests.
Unfortunately, the fear of litigation may cause employers to give only limited
publicity to their use of tests and so constrain the type of tests that are
used that many of the potential beneficial incentive effects of employment
testing may never be realized.
~5
BIBLIOGRAPHY,
Bishop, J. (1985) Preparing youth for employment. Columbus, Ohio: National
Center for Research in Vocational Education.
Bishop, J. (1987a) The recognition and reward of employee performance.
of Labor Economics.
Journal
Bishop, J. and Griffin, K. (forthcoming) Recruitment, training and skills
of small business employees.
Foundation, Washington, DC).
(National Federation of Independent Business
College Board. (1987) ATP Guide for High Schools and Colleges. College Entrance
Examination Board, Princeton, New Jersey.
Daymont, T. N. and Rumberger, R. W. (1982) "Job training in the schools."
In Job Training for Youth, edited by R. Taylor, H. Rosen, and F. Pratzner.
Columbus: The National Center for Research in Vocational Education,
The Ohio State University.
Department of Labor. (1970) General aptitude test battery manual. United
state Department of Labor, Manpower Administration.
Dumaret, A. (1985) "IQ, scholastic performance and behavior of sibs raised
in contrasting environments." J. Child Psychol. Psychiatry. 25:553-80.
Duyme, M. (1985) "Scholastic achievement as a function of parental social class:
an adoption study." Developmental Psychology, ed. C. J. Brainero, V.
F. Reyna, 319-25. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.
Flynn, James R. "The Mean IQ of Americans: Massive Gains 1932 to 1978."
Psychological Bulletin, 1984, Vol. 95, No.1, 29-51
Freeman, R. B. (1971) The market for college-trained manpower: A study in the
economics of career choice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
26
Freeman, R. (1976) The overeducated american. New York: Academic Press.
Friedman, T. and Williams, E. B. (1982) "CUrrent Use of Tests for
Employment." Ability testing: uses, consequences, and controversies,
part II: documentation section, edited by Alexandra K. Wigdor and Wendell
R. Gardner. Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 999-169.
Gardner, J. A. (1982) Influence of high school curriculum on determinants
of labor market experience. Columbus: The National Center for Research
in Vocational Education, The Ohio state University.
Goodlad, J. (1984). A place called school. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Gordon, R. A. (In Press). "IQ commensurability of black-white differences in
crime and delinquency". Personality and Individual .Behavior.
Got tf redson,
.
L. (1988) "Reconsidering fairness: a matter of social and ethical
priorities.
"
Journal of Vocational Behavior, 31, ~o. 3.
Hause, J. C. (1975) "Ability and schooling as determinants of lifetime earnings,
or if you're so smart, why aren't you rich." In Education, Income, and
Human Behavior, edited by F. T. Juster. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Hotchkiss, L. (1984) Effects of schooling on cognitive, attitudinal and
behavioral outcomes. Columbus: The National Center for Research in
Vocational Education, The Ohio State University.
Hunter, J. (1986) "Cognitive ability, cognitive aptitudes, job knowledge crnd
job performance." Journal of Vocational Behavior, 29, No.3, 340-362.
Hunter, J. and Schmidt, F. (1982) "Fitting people to jobs"~ Human Performance
and Productivity, edited.by Marvin Dunnette and Edwin Fleishman, 258-
271.
?'~
_J
Hunter, J. E.; Crosson, J. J. and Friedman, D. H. (1985) "The validity of the
armed services vocational aptitude battery (ASVAB) for civilian and
military job performance, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.
Hunter, J. E.; Schmidt, F. L. and Judiesch, M. K.
in output as a function of job complexity."
(1988) "Individual differences
Department of Industrial
Relations and Human Resources, University of Iowa.
Husen, T. (1951) "The influence of schooling upon IQ." Theoria.
Jencks, C. and Crouse, J. (1982) "Aptitude vs. achievement: should we replace
the SAT?" The Public Interest.
Jones. L. (1984) "White-black achievement differences." American Psychologist,
. 39, 1207-1213.
Kang, S. and Bishop, J. (1984) "The impact of curriculum on the non-college
bound youth's labor market outcomes." In High School Preparation for
Employment, 95-135. Columbus: The National Center for Research in
Vocational Education, The Ohio State University.
Klein, R.; Spady, R.; and Weiss, A. (1983) Factors affecting the output and
quit propensities of production workers.
and Columbia University.
New York: Bell Laboratories
Koretz, D.et.al. (1986) Trends in educational achievement. Washington:
Congressional Budget Office.
I.eestma, R. et. al. "Japanese education today.". A report from the U.S. Study
of Education in Japan prepared by a special task force of the OERI Japan
Study Team.
Lorge, 1. (1945) "Schooling makes a difference."
46, 483-492.
Teachers College Record,
28
!.o1eyer, R. . ( 1982) "Job training in the schools. II In Job Training for Youth,
edited by R. Taylor, H. Rosen, and F. Pratzner. Columbus: The National
Center for Research in Vocational Ed~cation, The Ohio state University.
National Assessment of Educational Progress. (1985) The reading report card.
Princeton, New Jersey: Educational Testing Service.
National Assessment of Educational Progress. (1988) Who reads best? Princeton,
New Jersey: Educational Testing Service.
National Assessment of Educational Progress. (1988) The mathematics report
card. Princeton, New Jersey: Educational Testing Service.
Reubens, B. (1969) From learning to earning: a transnational comparison of
transition services. R&D Monograph 63, u. S. Department of Labor.
Schiff, M., Duyme, M., Dumaret, A., stewart, J., Tomkiewicz, S., Feingold, J.
(1978) IIIntellectual status of working class children adopted into upper-
middle class families. II Science. 200:1503-04.
Schiff, M., Duyme, M., Dumaret, A., Tomkiewicz, S. (1982) IIHow much could we
boost scholastic achievement and IQ scores: a direct answer from a French
adoption study. II Cognition, 12:165-96.
Schmidt, F. (1986) liThe problem of group differences in ability test scores
for employment selection. II Journal of Vocational Behavior, 29, No.3,
340-362.
Sizer, T. R. (1984) Horace's compromise: The dilemma of the American high
school. The First Report from A Study of High Schools, co-sponsored
by the National Association of Secondary School Principals and the
Commission on Educational Issues of the National Association of
Independent Schools, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.
29
stevenson, S.: Lee, S. and Stigler, J. W. (1986) "Mathematics achievement
of Chinese, Japanese & American children." Science, 693-699.
Taubman, P. and Wales, T.
McGraw-Hill
(1975) Higher education and earnings, New York:
Tuddenham, R. D. (1948) "Soldier intelligence in world wars I and II. American
Psychologist, 1, 54-56.
Wigdor, A. K. and Hartigan, J. A. editors. (1988) Interim report-within group
scoring of the General Aptitude Test Battery. Washington, DC: National
Academy Press.
